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ANTITRUST LIMITATIONS ON PRICE MAINTENANCE,
MARKET DIVISION, AND QUALITY CONTROLS
IN FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
by Beverly A. Neblett
The essential feature of a franchise arrangement is the continuing na-
ture of the relationship between the franchisor and franchisee.1 Reciprocal
benefits and duties constitute the basis of the relationship and are required,
both from a legal and a commercial standpoint, by the mutual dependency
and the public identification of the franchisor and franchisee with the
same products, brands or services. The franchisor, who generally offers a
commodity which is protected by trademark or service mark registration,
may sell either a license to retail the particular product or service or the
right to conduct a business with an established name and operations format.
During the term of the franchise agreement the franchisor is responsible
for quality control, management training, advertising, product develop-
ment, and management services. The purchaser of the franchise, the fran-
chisee, operates as an independent businessman, but is responsible to the
franchisor for the maintenance of a standardized operating procedure
and product quality.
Franchising has been in the commercial limelight since World War II
because of the expanding number of franchise operations and the unique
advantages which the franchise arrangement offers to both parties? Dur-
ing this same period franchising has come under both political and judicial
scrutiny. While the Small Business Administration has encouraged fran-
chise investment,3 Congress has been concerned with the elimination of
unfair trade practices. Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have taken a closer look
at franchise practices with respect to federal antitrust laws. From this
governmental examination, and from private litigation, three principal
1 J. CURRY, PARTNERS FOR PROFIT 17 (1966); H. KURSH, THE FRANCHISE BOOM 13 (1962);
E. LEWIS & R. HANCOCK, THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTION 8 (1963).
'Franchising in its modern form began early in the twentieth century when automobile manu-
facturers and petroleum refiners licensed retailers to sell their product in assigned territories. A.
TUNICK, ARE You READY FOR FRANCHISING? 2 (Small Business Administration Small Marketers
Aids No. 115, 1967). Franchising came to be utilized not only in product or service retailing but
also in the licensing of an entire business operating with trademark rights. See Fels, Franchising-
Some Legal and Financial Considerations, in CREATVE BUSINESS FINANCING (V. Nordin ed. 1968).
For a brief account of the historical origins of franchises, see J. ATKINSON, FRANCHISING: THE
ODDS-ON FAVORITE (1968).
' See Zeidman, The Growth and Importance of Franchising-Its Impact on Small Business, 12
ANTITRUST BULL. 1191 (1967).
'Hearings on S. 2507 and S. 2321 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
a Prior to his recent appointment as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division,
Richard W. McLaren stated, "It is well known that the emphasis in antitrust enforcement has
been placed increasingly on what are regarded in official circles as anticompetitive practices at
the distribution level." McLaren, Territorial Restrictions, Exclusive Dealing, and Related Sales
Distribution: Problems under the Antitrust Laws, 11 PRACT. LAW. 79 (April 1965).
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categories of franchising practices have emerged within the purview of
federal antitrust statutes: price maintenance, market division, and quality
controls.
While federal law as embodied in the antitrust statutes clearly considers
resale price maintenance as restrictive of free economy, the status of market
division and quality controls as illegal restraints of trade under federal
law is less certain. Judicial formulation of legal standards to test the legality
of the latter two categories of franchise practices has been a difficult task.!
Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated substantial disagreement among
the Justices over the nature and impact of restrictions placed on a fran-
chisee in order to achieve market division and quality control.! The diffi-
culty in determining the impact of these restrictions on competition arises
not only from the variety of franchise operations, but also from the two-
fold effect of such arrangements since franchise restrictions may have an
impact on both interbrand and intrabrand competition. For example, it
is possible for a franchise distribution system to be, simultaneously, a re-
straint of trade with regard to intrabrand competition and a stimulus
to interbrand activity.'
The majority of antitrust decisions relevant to franchise practices in-
volve section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." This section has remained
the touchstone of antitrust enforcement" and of recovery in treble dam-
age suits based on illegal marketing schemes."' A charge of "continuing
theoretical discontinuities"'" is directed at inconsistent judicial applications
of the "rule of reason"'" under the specific language of section 1 that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . .
is declared to be illegal."' 4 In particular, the charge is directed at the
'The variety of products and services distributed by the franchising method makes generaliza-
tion hazardous. For example, franchising is frequently discussed in terms of three broad types of
systems-product retailing, retail business licensing, and licensing of trademarks for processing
plants. These are in turn subdivided into at least fifty subgroups and subclassifications. PRACTISING
LAW INSTITUTE, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE 9 (Commercial Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series vol. 10, 1968).
' See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775, 779 (1965).
a See note 82 infra, and accompanying text.
OSherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1964).
10 The Department of Justice may institute a criminal action or a civil suit against antitrust
violations. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) any person who makes an illegal contract or illegally con-
spires or combines in violation of 15 U.S.C. §5 1-7 (1964) is guilty of a misdemeanor and is
subject to either a fine or imprisonment, or both. Under 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964) the United States
Attorney General may direct suits in federal courts to restrain violations. Criminal cases are
ordinarily brought "only against hard core violations, such as price fixing, which the violators
would be bound to know were illegal." N.Y. Times, June 14, 1969, at 42, col. 1 (city ed.).
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) provides that "[a]ny person . . . injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained ....
12 Bork, supra note 7, at 777.
"
5 The "rule of reason" was formulated in 1911 in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911). In that case the Court stated that under section 1 of the Sherman Act a "standard of
reason" was to be applied and that restraints were to be considered unlawful only if they were
"undue" or "unreasonable." Id. at 1.
14 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1964).
[Vol. 2 3
COMMENTS
"failure to be clear about the scope of the per se concept,""5 under which
a proven contract, combination, or conspiracy is considered unreasonable
without inquiry into its purpose or effect upon competition. Certain com-
binations are thus illegal per se "irrespective of the factual situation which
may be offered in their defense .... ""
Disagreement over the impact of vertical restrictions on competition,
particularly in a franchise context, is not confined to the courts. Some
commentators argue that franchising which restricts intrabrand competi-
tion generally promotes interbrand competition by diffusing control and
ownership of retail outlets." It is pointed out that franchising offers an
alternative to vertical integration and to increased ownership of retail or
wholesale distributorships by manufacturers. These commentators con-
clude that territorial restrictions and quality controls should be governed
by a test based upon the rule of reason taking into consideration the special
features of the franchise system. Other writers believe that features of
what they term "true franchising" should be tested by a determination
of reasonableness, but that features of other franchising systems should
be judicially screened on a per se basis."8 The "true" franchise is apparently
distinguished because of its smaller economic size and the exclusive identity
of the franchisee with the franchisor's trademark.
Consideration of the per se doctrine is crucial in drafting a franchise
agreement, in deciding whether conduct is unlawful, and in determining
the quantum of proof necessary to establish a violation of the antitrust
laws. If the precise limits of the concept's application are indefinite, the
franchisor and franchisee are forced to act at their peril or to draft fran-
chise agreements of uncertain legality. The purpose of this Comment is
to discuss the recent developments in federal antitrust law which have
broadened the scope of the per se doctrine and which are reshaping the
obligations and the relationship of the franchisor and franchisee.
I. PRICE FIXING
Strict Per Se Illegality. The per se concept is most clear in its application
to price fixing," without regard to the horizontal or vertical nature of the
I Bork, supra note 7, at 777. The Supreme Court gave a summation of the per se rule in
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
"Dieterich, Antitrust Considerations in Licenses and Franchise Contracts, in SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, SEVENTH INSTITUTE ON PATENT LAW (1969).
"
7 Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 176 (1963); Preston,
Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW
& CONTEMp. PREo. 506 (1965). See also Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing,
76 YALE L.J. 722 (1967);. Bork, A ReAly to Professors Gould and Yanty, 76 YALE L.J. 731
(1967).
SSee notes 165," 166 infra, and accompanying text.
" See A. PHILLTPS, MARKET STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE 113, 201 (1962).
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price control." The foundation for this statutory application was laid in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States"' and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons.' In Addyston a horizontal price fixing scheme among com-
peting manufacturers was held illegal. The reasonableness of the prices,
the Court held, was not a question open to the courts at common law and
would not justify the price fixing scheme under the antitrust law. Dr.
Miles involved a private suit brought by a manufacturer of drugs against
a wholesale company which had induced dealers to violate contract re-
strictions on resale prices. The express vertical agreements between the
manufacturer and its retailers were held void as illegal restraints on the
alienation of commodities and illegal contracts under the Sherman Act.
Although the agreements were vertical, the Court's language indicated that
a similar result would have occurred if the dealers had horizontally agreed
upon the same price restrictions. Thus, a contract between dealers hori-
zontally fixing prices would also be "injurious to the public interest and
void."
Subsequent cases have demonstrated that any combination with the
purpose of price fixing among competitors by either direct" or indirect'
means would incur per se treatment. Price fixing was broadly defined in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co." to include "more than the mere
establishment of uniform prices."2 A group of major oil companies had
instituted buying programs whereby each company would purchase sur-
plus gasoline from independent refineries which were selling the gasoline
at distress prices. These programs were held to constitute a species of price
fixing or manipulation. In earlier cases the per se doctrine was applied to
a combination for the purpose of price fixing only if the cooperating
competitors controlled the relevant market.' In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
however, the Court stated that market dominance is not essential to the
establishment of a per se violation.
Illegality in the Franchise Context. A franchise relationship offers no
exception to the per se application of the Sherman Act to a vertical com-
" There are several classifications of combinations or restraints, including horizontal, chain,
and vertical types. "The horizontal combination brings together firms at the same stage of pro-
duction, turning out the same product, and selling it in the same market. . . . The chain com-
bination unites companies at the same stage of production that sell the same product in different
local markets. . . . Vertical integration reaches forward or backward or both to combine firms at
successive stages of production." C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 95-96 (rev. ed.
1960). The "chain" classification is usually considered as a horizontal combination, and thus the
fundamental distinction is between horizontal and vertical restraints.
21 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
22220 U.S. 373 (1910).
13 d. at 408.
4 See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
"a National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965)
(agreement among competing manufacturers to change the content of food products).
'310 U.S. 150 (1940).
' Id. at 222.
2 For example, where manufacturers formed an association controlling eighty-two per cent
of the vitreous pottery industry, the members were convicted of violating section 1 by combining
to limit sales and to fix prices. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (19271.
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bination between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or retailer to prevent
price reductions. 9 In particular, section 1 of the Act will prevent a fran-
chisor, who has licensed a franchisee to sell a product or service, from
dictating a unit price for advertising purposes.' Thus, in the franchising
of restaurants it is apparently illegal to supply menus to the franchisee
with the prices set by the franchisor even though the menu is copyrighted
and has trademark features. The position of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion makes it clear that the franchisor should either advertise without indi-
cating prices or expressly permit the particular franchisee to decide prices
for local advertising."
Normally a combination of either a horizontal or vertical nature seeks
to keep prices above a certain minimum. In a 1967 Supreme Court de-
cision, Albrecht v. Herald Co.,a" no exception to the rule of per se illegality
was made for a "franchise" arrangement which gave the franchisee a
monopoly because there was no interbrand competition. In that case a
newspaper terminated the distributor's exclusive dealership when he ex-
ceeded the predetermined maximum price level. The Court followed the
single Supreme Court precedent invalidating maximum price controls
which are horizontally agreed upon by two competitors and imposed upon
their retailers."
The application of the per se rule to the price restraint in Albrecht has
been criticized as failing to consider "whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."' Indeed, the
newspaper in Albrecht claimed that its purpose for imposing price ceilings
was to protect the public from the effects of the absence of interbrand
competition at the distribution level." Typically the depressing effect of
interbrand competition on prices would tempt the franchisor to impose
minimum prices. However, absent fair trade protection," conduct by the
" In Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 50s (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965), the trial court had held as illegal provisions in pre-1955 franchise
agreements which required dealers "[t]o maintain prices on products designated in, and as per
Carvel Standard Operating Procedure and not to conduct any reduced price sales of these items
without written consent from Carvel." Id. at 509. No appeal was taken from that portion of the
judgment.
" According to the General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission:
A recent study has been made within the Commission of several problems of
franchising, and it has been concluded that when used in connection with franchise
arrangements, price fixing or tampering with prices is unlawful per se, as it is when
found in other situations ...
The advertising of the franchisee's prices by the franchisor, and his supplying of
menus with prices to be used by the franchisee, strongly imply an agreement be-
tween them to sell the franchised product at a fixed price.
Letter from John V. Buffington, General Counsel, to Beverly A. Neblett, June 6, 1969. See also
FTC Advisory Opinion No. 278, Aug. 23, 1968.
31 Id.
"2390 U.S. 145 (1968).
"Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
'" Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Antitrust Review, 57
CALrF. L. REV. 182, 196 (1969), citing Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See note 40 infra.
"5 Justice Harlan placed considerable significance on this alleged purpose in his dissenting opinion
in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
"SA statutory exception to illegal price fixing was created by Congress in the Miller-Tydings
1969]
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franchisor to enforce price restrictions is illegal per se and subjects the
franchisor to liability in an action for treble damages."7 Even if fran-
chisees in a given area prefer uniform prices, any horizontal combination
could subject each participant to liability for treble damages to other
franchisees or to the franchisor.'
Exceptions to Per Se Illegality." Although the horizontal-vertical dis-
tinction does not significantly affect the result in cases involving price
fixing, an exception to the per se doctrine has developed which is related
to the market structure in which the alleged violation occurred. The ex-
ception, based upon the manufacturer's right to choose wholesalers and
retailers with whom he will deal in a vertical relationship,' may offer a
still viable principle to guide the dealings between the franchisor and his
franchisees. The reasoning behind the exception was first expounded by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co."1 In upholding a
demurrer to an indictment alleging a combination to fix resale prices in
violation of the Sherman Act, the Court distinguished Dr. Miles on the
ground that Colgate had not entered into a contract or agreement with
its retailers. It had simply refused to deal further with those who would
not maintain suggested minimum prices. The Court concluded with the
troublesome passage that:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does
not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in
advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. '
The Colgate doctrine was narrowed by cases which extended the per se
rule from express to implied agreements.' An unlawful combination was
Act Amendment of 1937, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (amending § 1 of the Sherman Act), and in the
McGuire Fair Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. S 45 (1964).
" See Note, The Franchisor as Plaintiff in Treble Damage Actions: An Antitrust Anomaly, 49
B.U.L. REv. 322 (1969).
as One franchisee could recover treble damages from other franchisees if they had imposed prices
on him coercively. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968). The Court rejected the use of the in Pari delicto doctrine as a bar to an antitrust damage
suit brought by franchisees against the muffler manufacturer. However, the Court could not agree
as to why it did so. As the opinion of Justice Black indicated, the franchisee's participation had
not been "voluntary in any meaningful sense." Id. at 139. Apparently the decision would not apply
to situations where the plaintiffs had actively and voluntarily participated. In such situations re-
covery by the franchisee would be barred.
asThe 1952 McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act created a statutory
exemption from the federal antitrust statutes prohibiting resale price maintenance agreements where
state legislation authorized an exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). See note 36 supra.
4A group of cases excepts certain horizontal conduct involving price maintenance. Sugar In-
stitute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). However, these cases do not represent a "line" of reasoning
and offer no guideline for conduct among franchisees or franchisors. As one commentator ex-
plains, "The authorities upholding loose-knit arrangements are extremely sparse, deal mainly with
sui generis statements of fact, and have little precedential force." M. HANDLER, ANTrRusT IN PER-
SPECTIVE 26 (1957).
4'250 U.S. 300 (1919).4 1d. at 307.43 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
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found in the course of conduct of a drug company in United States v.
Parke, Davis fg Co." In the absence of a contract or agreement the com-
pany enlisted some of its retailers and wholesalers in order to force other
retailers to maintain suggested minimum prices. Parke, Davis went "beyond
mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal" 5 by seek-
ing and obtaining assurances of compliance among its retailers and by
using the acquiescence of some to gain assurance from others. Relying
on the Parke, Davis decision, the Second Circuit concluded that a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant was not proper in a case in which the
manufacturer allegedly had refused to deal with the plaintiff because of
noncompliance with a price schedule."
The majority opinion in Parke, Davis has led to disagreement over the
continuing significance of the Colgate doctrine." The distinction drawn
between mere refusal to deal and something "beyond" may be slight;
nevertheless that "narrow channel"" of conduct is apparently intact and
acknowledged as a "battered but durable precedent."" Thus, if a dis-
tributor initially and continuously refuses to acquiesce to resale price rec-
ommendations or demands by a manufacturer, he may be barred from
recovery under the Sherman Act because the action of the manufacturer
would be unilateral and any subsequent refusal to deal would fall within
Colgate. As the Parke, Davis decision acknowledged and as the First Circuit
demonstrated in Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co.,"° the immunization from anti-
trust proscriptions afforded by Colgate will exist as long as the Sherman
Act requires a contract, combination, or conspiracy." The court in Quinn
held that where a defendant oil company had unsuccessfully attempted
to coerce a solitary dealer into agreeing to reduce his prices, the requisite
combination for a section 1 violation was not shown by the pleadings.
The Colgate channel may have been further narrowed by Albrecht, in
which the Supreme Court faced the problem of legal unilateral action
versus illegal concerted action under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
Court found the necessary combination or contract in the actions of the
defendant newspaper, a carrier hired solely to compete with the plaintiff,
and a company employed to solicit customers for the carrier. However, a
jury had found that the newspaper's attempted control and termination
44362 U.S. 29 (1960).
5id. at 44.
4" George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
"'See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 49
(1960); Fulda, Individual Refusals To Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical
Restraint, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 590 (1965).
48According to the Second Circuit, "The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through
which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity
as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprises." George W. Warner & Co.
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960).
"Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 680 (1962).
5a375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967) (dismissal of former dealer's suit against oil company affirmed
where amended complaint alleged termination of lease but failed to allege a combination). But see
Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
" See also Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 286 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (summary judgment
granted to defendant manufacturer who had refused unilaterally to deal with the plaintiff dis-
tributor because the plaintiff declined to maintain a resale price).
1969]
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of the plaintiff were entirely unilateral and the circuit court had affirmed.'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that a concert of action was im-
plied as a matter of law. According to one writer, the Court stretched
"to the breaking point the combination concept" by indicating that if
the plaintiff had once complied with the maximum price limit, he could
have alleged under the Parke, Davis decision a combination between him-
self and the newspaper." Moreover, he could have alleged a combination
between the newspaper and his former customers.
In 1926 two exceptions to the per se illegality of price fixing were
recognized in United States v. General Electric Co.4 The Supreme Court
sanctioned General Electric's vertical control of the prices of lamps which
it sold by consignment and its horizontal control of the prices charged by
its patent licensee, Westinghouse.' The consignment exception, based on
an agency relationship, was narrowed by the Court in Simpson v. Union
Oil Co." to exclude a nominal consignment. Union Oil had exercised price
controls in over 4,000 retail stations through consignment agreements
which the lessees of the outlets were required to sign and which contained
provisions retaining title to the gasoline in the company. A lease was not
renewed if the lessee failed to maintain the price schedule. The Supreme
Court found a violation of the Sherman Act and granted a partial sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiff, a terminated dealer. A per se violation
of the Sherman Act occurs, the Court held, when "a 'consignment' device
is used to cover a vast gasoline distribution system, fixing prices through
many retail outlets," and in such cases "the antitrust laws prevent calling
the 'consignment' an agency."'" The Court distinguished United States v.
General Electric Co. by determining that the earlier holding rested ex-
clusively on patent law. This determination led the dissent in Simpson"
to conclude that General Electric had thus been overruled because its actual
basis was the finding of a bona fide agency and because the consignment
arrangements were very similiar to those employed by Union Oil. Regard-
less of the impact of Simpson on the General Electric decision, in ordinary
circumstances involving parties of more balanced economic strength "an
owner of an article may send it to a dealer who may in turn undertake
to sell it only at a price determined by the owner. ' '..
The Sherman Act requirement of a contract, combination, or conspiracy
presented no problem to the Supreme Court in Simpson since the consign-
ment agreement between the oil company and the plaintiff supplied the
necessary element of a contract. Moreover, there was proof of a large
scale program of price fixing among all the dealers. The consignment
"2 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966).
"Handler, supra note 34, at 187; see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968).
'1272 U.S. 476 (1926).
aa An exception to the general illegality of horizontal price fixing exists where a patentee fixes
the price at which a patented product may be sold by a manufacturing licensee. See cases cited
in Dieterich, supra note 16.
as 3 7 7 U.S. 13 (1964).
'
7 1d. at 21.
as Id. at 25 (Stewart, J.).
5 Id. at 21.
[Vol. 23
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contract, the Court concluded, was used coercively to maintain gasoline
prices as effectively as the Parke, Davis techniques of price control had
been used.
A final exception to the per se illegality of resale price maintenance
under section 1 of the Sherman Act occurs when a manufacturer or fran-
chisor submits suggested price lists to a distributor. Where the facts indi-
cated that a manufacturer only "advised" its retailer and made no at-
tempt to enforce its price suggestions, the Third Circuit held that a finding
of illegal price fixing was clearly erroneous.' ° In addition, the fact that
two other retail stores had voluntarily gone along with the price lists did
not make them co-conspirators. The court of appeals emphasized that
"tconscious parallelism has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman
Act entirely."'" In Susser v. Carvel Corp." the recommendation of retail
prices by a franchisor, absent coercion, was held to be insufficient to
establish illegal price fixing. To protect the franchisor, the Carvel agree-
ment provided that the recommendation was "in no manner binding upon
the dealer"63 and that the franchisee was permitted to advertise at prices
of his own choosing. Carvel also appointed a representative board of gov-
ernors from the dealers to act as a medium for the interchange of ideas
and to make price recommendations.
II. TERRITORIAL AND CUSTOMER RESTRAINTS
The Horizontal-Vertical Distinction. In cases not involving the licensing
of a patent," the horizontal-vertical distinction has played an important
role in determining the application of the per se concept to territorial or
"Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
6t Id. at 791, citing Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954).
6' 3 32 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125
(1965). See also Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1500 (1959), wherein the Commis-
sion said that suggested retail prices without an agreement and without enforcement of their
maintenance were legal. Cf. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969)
(a non-franchise situation where an agreement among a few dominant sellers to exchange price
information whenever requested was held per se illegal). According to E. LEwis & R. HANCOCK,
THE FRANCHISE SYsTEM OF DISTRIBUTION 3 (Small Business Administration Management Research
Summary 1966): "The most common policy of franchisors regarding the pricing of their goods
and services by franchisees is to issue a suggested price list and let the franchisee set prices in
terms of his own competitive situation. Some franchisors establish the maximum price the fran-
chisee may charge, and some specify the exact prices at which the franchised products must be
sold."
' The Second Circuit approved a revised franchise agreement which provided that: "The dealer
shall have the right to sell Carvel's Frozen Dairy Product and/or other items authorized for sale
by him under the terms of this agreement at any price that the dealer determines. Wherever Carvel
recommends a retail price, such recommendation is based upon Carvel's experience concerning all
factors that enter into a proper price, but such recommendation is in no manner binding upon the
dealer." 332 F.2d at 509. The plaintiffs, franchised dealers, alleged that Carvel's course of conduct
had maintained prices illegally. For example, for purposes of quality control, Carvel had prescribed
in the operating manual only 100 and 200 cones. The Second Circuit approved the principle
followed by the trial judge that "the mere existence of a means whereby retail price levels are
recommended is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Sherman Act, unless there is a showing
of an attempt to enforce a price structure upon the retail tradesmen." Id. at 510.
64A patentee may place territorial restrictions on a licensee of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 261
(1964) provides: "The applicant, patentee, or his assigns .. . may in like manner grant and con-
vey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified
part of the United States."
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customer divisions of a market. Although horizontal boycotts and market
division among competitors have been compared to illegal price fixing
and, under most circumstances, have been held illegal per se, until 1967
vertical restrictions were tested in federal courts by a broad determination
of their reasonableness."5
Horizontal market divisions may involve both territorial and customer
restraints which are deemed illegal per se." Often, such restraints are part
and parcel of illegal price fixing schemes and under such circumstances,
condemnation of the price fixing will envelop the market division as an
aggregation of trade restraints." A similar result will occur if vertical re-
straints on the market are integrated with illegal resale price fixing. 8
Thus, as Justice Douglas pointed out in Albrecht, in private suits for
treble damages "[w]hether an exclusive territorial franchise in a vertical
arrangement is per se unreasonable is a much mooted question. '"" However,
if there is no integration of restraints in the vertical arrangement, customer
and territorial restrictions will be tested separately.
Horizontal in Substance: Vertical in Form. Generally, in any "operating" 0
franchise there are restrictions on the territory in which the franchisee
may operate. 7' Given the lingering uncertainty of the law with regard to
vertical territorial or customer restraints and the relative certainty of the
per se illegality of horizontal restraints, "[t]he primary danger with respect
to a vertical territorial restriction is that it may be regarded as a hori-
zontal conspiracy."' In two Supreme Court decisions the Government won
injunctions against horizontal restraints initiated by licensees, although
the restraints were vertical in form. The United States v. General Motors
Co. ' case concerned customer restrictions on car dealers in the Los Angeles
area. A number of the dealers asked General Motors to prevent other
dealers from selling through local discount houses. The Supreme Court
65 See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv. L. Rev.
795 (1962). In contrast, vertical restrictions were held illegal in some states under antitrust legis-
lation passed contemporaneously with the Sherman Act. One example of vigorous state enforcement
is Texas. In that state, contracts of sale, lease, and dealership and franchise agreements are void if
they contain territorial or customer restrictions. Patrizi v. McAninch, 153 Tex. 389, 269 S.W.2d
343 (1954). Among the narrow exceptions to the Texas antitrust statutes arc contracts of agency.
Barr v. Southwest Wholesale Furniture & Appliance Co., 331 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
See also 13 BAYLOR L. REv. 295 (1961).
" Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (combination of manu-
facturers, distributors, and a retailer to boycott another retailer); Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (agreement by guild members to
boycott retailers engaging in "style piracy"); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (agreement among members of a retailer's association to
boycott wholesalers who sold directly to the retail trade).
6 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
65United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
6"Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (concurring opinion).
" With an "operating" franchise contract the franchisor allows the franchisee to operate one
or several franchises but not to subfranchise. A second type of contract is the "area franchise"
arrangement, which allows the franchisee to engage in subfranchising in a large territory. A.
LAPIN, ExPANDING SALES THROUGH FRANCHISING 3 (Small Business Administration Management
Aids No. 182, 1968).
71 See G. GLICKMAN, 15 BUSINESS ORGANIZATONs, FRANCHISING § 4.02(2) (1969).
7 McLaren, supra note 5, at 80.
73384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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found a "classic conspiracy in restraint of trade"'7 under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. That the franchised dealers were selling through discount
houses in violation of their dealer contracts was no defense to the con-
spiracy charge. The Court found "joint and collaborative action ...per-
vasive in the initiation, execution, and fulfillment of the plan"'t to elimi-
nate discounters from access to the market. Although price fixing was not
an issue, the Court noted that inherent in the conspiracy was an added
and substantial restraint upon price competition and that "the per se rule
applies even when the effect upon prices is indirect."7
The Court again examined the substance of territorial restraints in
United States v. Sealy, Inc." The Sealy mattress company was charged with
resale price fixing and illegal territorial allocation. An injunction against
the price fixing was not appealed. However, the Government appealed
from the finding of the district court that under the rule of reason the
allocation of mutually exclusive territory among Sealy licensees was not
proved unreasonable in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. As an
opening remark, the Supreme Court explained that:
Because this Court has distinguished between horizontal and vertical terri-
torial limitations for purposes of the impact of the Sherman Act, it is first
necessary to determine whether the territorial arrangements here are to be
treated as the creature of the licensor, Sealy, or as the product of a horizontal
arrangement among the licensees."8
Because the Sealy licensees owned substantially all of the Sealy stock and
exercised control of the corporation, the Court found that the territorial
arrangements were the creature of horizontal action. Thus, the Sealy
violation could be distinguished, in the Court's view, from vertical re-
straintsm and could come within the per se condemnation of prior cases.
This strict condemnation was appropriate, moreover, because, in the view
of the majority, the territorial restraints were a part of the unlawful price
fixing, which "underline[d] the horizontal nature of the enterprise."'
Justice Harlan, who had concurred in the General Motors decision, dis-
agreed with the majority's characterization of the Sealy arrangements as
horizontal. He argued in his dissents' that, as a vertical restraint, the
legality of the restraint was properly determined by the rule of reason.
According to Justice Harlan:
With respect to vertical restrictions, it has long been recognized that in
order to engage in effective interbrand competition, some limitations on
intrabrand competition may be necessary. Restraints of this type 'may be
allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable
14 Id. at 140.
15Id. at 143.781d. at 147.
"7388 U.S. 350 (1967).
7 Id. at 352.
79In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Supreme Court hesitated
in applying the per se concept to vertical restraints, but overcame its hesitation in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See text accompanying notes 105-08 infra.




means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business ...and
,82within the "rule of reason ....,.
For the large number of independent franchisors the Sealy and General
Motors decisions have obvious significance. The franchisor should be ad-
vised not to cooperate in the event that franchisees act collectively to re-
strain certain of their members. Indeed, the franchisor should take affirma-
tive steps and request that the horizontal restraints be discontinued.
Recent Challenges to Vertical Restraints. Few Supreme Court decisions
considered the legality of territorial and customer restrictions in a vertical
context until 1963. One reason for the lack of judicial comment or con-
sideration was that "during the first 60 years of the Sherman Act, despite
the widespread use of such restrictions, apparently not a single one was
ever challenged by the Department of Justice."' Moreover, a series of
cases had upheld such restraints unless they were ancillary to a price fixing
scheme or unless the manufacturer imposing the restrictions had a mo-
nopoly.' Thus, in United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms" customer re-
strictions were struck down under section 2 of the Sherman Act by a
federal district court because the licensor had an absolute monopoly on
the source of the product. The sole manufacturer of linen rugs imposed
the vertical restrictions on its distributors for the purpose of preventing
intrabrand competition between itself and the distributors in the bid-
ding for government contracts. Although there were no other customer
restraints, the manufacturer instructed its jobbers not to bid for govern-
ment contracts and, in one instance, refused to deliver the unfinished rugs
to a jobber who had underbid Klearflax. While Klearflax had illegally re-
fused to sell the rugs, the court noted that a limitation on the amount of
goods sold by the manufacturer to each distributor might be justified even
thought the limitation could make it difficult for the distributor to com-
pete."
In 1948 the Department of Justice reported that it considered vertical
territorial and customer restrictions illegal per se." This administrative
challenge resulted in some modification of contracts in the automobile and
other industries during the 1950's. Most of the Department's complaints
and those of the Federal Trade Commission ended in consent decrees. 8
82388 U.S. at 359 (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
Note that Justice Harlan also dissented in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968), but
concurred in part and dissented in part with Justice Stewart in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
a Pollock, Franchising, Cnstomer Restrictions and Building a Better Mouse Trap, 46 CHICAGO
B. REc. 378 (1965).
"
4 Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 F. 29 (9th Cir.
1923); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 F. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Revlon Prods. Corp.
v. Bernstein, 204 Misc. 80, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 285 App. Div.
1139, 142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1955).
"563 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945). See also Roux Distrib. Co., 55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959).
86 63 F. Supp. at 41.
87 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Automobile Marketing Legislation of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 362 (1956).
88E.g., United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 5 69,011 (W.D.N.Y. 1958);
United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 5 68,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
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However, in United States v. White Motor Co.8" a federal district court
for the first time granted a summary judgment against a leading manu-
facturer of trucks on the basis of both unlawful price fixing and customer
and territorial restraints. The franchise contracts provided that neither
the distributors nor the dealers could sell to the government and expressly
limited sales to certain territories. The district court found that the price
fixing was not an integral part of the distribution system, and White
Motor appealed only from the ruling against the legality of the territorial
restraints. Without a finding of an integrated scheme and without the
benefit of detailed findings on the impact of the territorial restraints, the
Supreme Court" did not follow an earlier decision9' which had applied the
per se concept to an integrated price fixing and distribution scheme. The
majority concluded that the proper rule of law should be determined after
a trial. It set the problem of deciding whether the per se concept would
apply in a vertical-horizontal context:
Horizontal territorial limitations, like 'group boycotts, or concerted re-
fusals by traders to deal with other traders' . . . , are naked restraints of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial
limitation may or may not have that purpose or effect .... We need to know
more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on compe-
tition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition
and lack ...any redeeming virtue' . . . and therefore should be classified as
per se violations of the Sherman Act."
White Motor revealed considerable disagreement among the members
of the Court."' Justice Brennan, in a separate concurring opinion, frag-
mentized the possible violation into two distinct problems. He cautioned
against analogizing a truly vertical territorial restraint to horizontal divi-
sions of markets or to resale prices maintenance. He further suggested that
vertical and horizontal restraints could be distinguished by their effect
upon interbrand competition. Justice Clark, joined by Justice Black and
the Chief Justice, dissented on the ground that admittedly White Motor
was restraining competition among its dealers and thus a remand would
be futile because "the rule of reason is inapplicable to agreements made
solely for the purpose of eliminating competition."' Justice Clark found
that the customer and territorial restraints composed "one of the most
brazen violations of the Sherman Act that I have experienced in a quarter
of a century."' Moreover, they were completely analogous to horizontal
restraints and "their intended and actual effect is the same as, if not even
more destructive than a price fixing agreement or any of its per se counter-
parts."' In effect, the dissent abolished the distinction between interbrand
and intrabrand competition.
89 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
"
8White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
"' United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
92 372 U.S. at 263.
"Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brennan concurred. Id. at 264. Justices
Clark and Black and Chief Justice Warren dissented. Id. at 275. Justice White did not participate.
94Id. at 281.
9 Id. at 276.
96 Id. at 279.
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Reasonable Vertical Restraints. In White Motor the Court was unable
to benefit from additional inquiry into the impact of vertical restraints on
competition because the company entered into a consent decree before the
trial materialized. 7 Thus the question of law remained undetermined.
When territorial restrictions were challenged by the Federal Trade Com-
mission under section 5 of the FTC Act, 8 the courts measured the re-
strictions by the rule of reason on the basis of full evidentiary hearings.
In each case the restraints were found to be reasonable. In the first, Snap-
On Tools Corp. v. FTC,' the franchised dealers maintained designated
routes and sold out of mobile, walk-in trucks. The dealers were free to
sell to any customers who entered the territory. Following Justice Bren-
nan's emphasis in White Motor on interbrand versus intrabrand competi-
tion, the Court examined the record and concluded that it failed to demon-
strate that Snap-On's "vertically imposed territorial franchisees have the
same pernicious purpose and have the same inhibitory effects upon compe-
tition as horizontal divisions of markets.' '.. The record demonstrated to
the Court that the market divisions were prompted by reasonable business
expectations, that there was no illegal price fixing scheme, and that the
territories promoted, rather than suppressed, "in a broad, meaningful way"
competition between Snap-On and other manufacturers of similar prod-
ucts.'"' This interbrand competition would justify "a minimal curtailment
of intrabrand competition among its dealers."'" Although Snap-On was
brought under section 5 of the FTC Act, the court followed the rule of
reason under section 1 of the Sherman Act, noting that Snap-On was not
in a monopoly position, nor did it have a monopolistic purpose.
The Seventh Circuit decision in Sandura v. FTC'9' involved closed terri-
tories given by a failing company to attract distributors and to protect
their large investments in advertising to re-establish the Sandura product.
Under those circumstances the court upheld the restrictions as increasing
"the competitive good that flows from interbrand competition without
any showing of detriment to intrabrand competition."'"
Per Se Illegality in Scbwinn. Sandura and Snap-On set the stage for the
1967 decision in United States v. Arnold Scbwinn & Co.'" Facets of the
bicycle company's franchise distribution system were the basis of charges
of price fixing, illegal allocation of territories, and customer restrictions
in violation of the Sherman Act. Under its challenged distribution plans,
Schwinn franchised wholesale distributorships to serve areas in which re-
tail stores were also franchised. As Schwinn's agent, the distributor could
97 1964 Trade Cas. 5 71,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
9838 Star. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
"'321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
100 Id. at 833, quoting the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1963).
''321 F.2d at 831.
102 Id. at 832.
103339 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1964).
'
4 Id. at 858.
'0'388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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sell or send bicycles only to franchised outlets in its area. The outlets under-
stood that they should not sell to unfranchised dealers or discount houses.
Noncompliance resulted in threats of termination.
The issues on direct appeal to the Supreme Court were the legality,
absent evidence of illegal price fixing, of the customer restrictions (1) on
distributors and retailers where goods were sold and (2) on wholesale dis-
tributors where the goods were consigned."° Since the source of the re-
strictions was Schwinn, the Supreme Court emphasized that the restrictions
were vertical in nature. Invoking the "ancient rule against restraints on
alienation,' ' 7 the Court held that customer restraints where goods were
sold were illegal per se:
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with
dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or
persons to whom the product may be transferred-whether by explicit agree-
ment or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee-is a per se
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."°
Applying the rule of reason to the consignment distribution plan, the Court
upheld the customer restrictions on distributors in such transactions as
being reasonably necessary to meet the competition of more powerful
manufacturers.
Alternative Territorial Controls After Scbwinn. By affirming the district
court's application of the per se concept to territorial restrictions and by
placing customer restraints in the same category, the Court in Sclwinn
struck at the basis of many franchise systems." 9 The decision has been
criticized for not clearly defining the application of the per se rule to
distribution restrictions imposed by a new, failing, or struggling com-
pany.' On the other hand, some have praised the Scbwinn limitations on
the use of vertical restraints as "sound in economics and in policy."' .1.
Certainly for the present, per se limitations on customer or territorial con-
trols will have a definite and substantial impact on franchise operations
which involve retail or wholesale distribution of a product."' Few arrange-
ments of that category can utilize a consignment system in a practical
" The dismissal of the price fixing charge was not appealed. The district court enjoined terri-
torial restraints on goods sold to franchised distributors as illegal per se and the company did not
appeal from the injunction. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
10 388 U.S. at 380. See also the separate opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 391.
'
05 1d. at 382.
'0' See E. LEWIS & R. HANCOCK, THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTION 41 (1963).
"0 Kittelle, Territorial and Customer Restrictions Through Consignment or Agency-Schwinn
or Sin, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1007 (1967); Comment, The Impact of the Schwinn Case on Terri-
torial Restrictions, 46 TEXAS L. RE. 497, 510 (1968).
... Address by Edwin M. Zimmerman, First Assistant, Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice,
before the 1967 Federal Bar Association Convention, San Francisco, Calif., July 28, 1967.
.. But see Janet Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir. 1968),
wherein the Second Circuit stated that the existence of a customer limitation clause "does not
necessarily imply a per se violation." In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn dq Co. the Supreme
Court premised its finding of a per se violation on the fact that Schwinn had been "firm and
resolute" in insisting on compliance. 396 F.2d at 406. Since the evidence in Lanvin on that issue
was conflicting, the circuit court held that such an issue is best settled by the jury.
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way, and the Court in Schwinn warned that it would scrutinize and dis-
card that protective label where the dealer's functions were distinguishable
from those of an "agent or salesman."
For the category of franchise systems concerned primarily with product
retailing, the question then remains: What are the maximum restrictions
which a franchisor may impose vertically to divide product distribution
among his franchisees on the basis of territory or customer allocation?
For example, can the franchisor impose customer restrictions indirectly
by demanding contractual guarantees of minimum standards of service
from his franchisees to protect his good will and trademark? Beyond
maintaining a sometimes burdensome consignment system within the
bounds set by Simpson, there are two contractual means which a franchisor
may implement with judicial endorsement to achieve this division. Both
were expressly approved by the district court on remand in Schwinn."'
The first means is the creation of "areas of prime responsibility" as the
term has been used by the Department of Justice and by the Federal Trade
Commission in consent decrees "4 and as mentioned by Justice Brennan in
his concurring opinion in White Motor."' Under such a contractual pro-
vision the franchisee agrees to use his best efforts to promote the product
in the given area, but there is no contractual restriction on his efforts
outside the area. Although the terms of these provisions vary, they may
provide for referral of inquiries to the franchisee and require the approval
of the franchisor for any expansion of the area. In addition, the provisions
may contain an express denial of any customer restraint."'
A clause granting the franchisee an area of primary responsibility will
usually provide that the franchisor can terminate the relationship if the
franchisee does not adequately represent the franchisor in the assigned
area. There is some disagreement as to the effectiveness of such a clause
in a franchise contract, especially when a high degree of enforcement could
become an unreasonable restraint of trade."' The district court in Schwinn
on remand indicated that termination would be proper if there was not
adequate representation in the assigned territory. The legality of termi-
nation would be determined by the rule of reason. In a treble damages
113 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
14United States v. Rudolph Wirlitzer Co., 1968 Trade Cas. 5 69,011 (W.D.N.Y. 1968);
United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 3 68,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956). See also Chadwell &
Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Licensing and Franchising, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 15 (1967).
115 372 U.S. at 264.
. The following provisions are an example of a typical arrangement and were taken from a
franchise agreement for the distribution of lawn sprinkler systems:
Territory:
The territory in which FRANCHISEE may exercise the rights granted hereunder
shall be: . In order to protect the interests of all
[trademark name] franchisees, permit the orderly growth of the [trademark name]
concept and encourage maximum penetration of all market areas, FRANCHISEE
agrees not to provide [trademark name] services within any area assigned to another
franchisee without his written approval in advance; provided that the franchisee may
sell products and services to any prospect who contacts him at the franchisee's
office within the territory assigned regardless of whether or not such prospect's prop-
erty is located within the above territory.
Since the agreement restricts services, but not sales, to the assigned territory, on its face it is not
violative of the limitations on vertical restraints.
n"See Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 321 F.2d 825, 832 (7th Cir. 1963).
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suit 1'8 subsequent to Scbwinn, a federal district court refused to grant sum-
mary judgment to a defendant manufacturer who allegedly had termi-
nated the plaintiff's distributorship because of sales made beyond the range
of its service facilities. The contract stated that "to provide after-sales
service in a satisfactory manner dealers are forbidden to make shipments
beyond the normal range of their service facilities." 1  The court denied
the motion because it felt that evidence was needed "of the course of deal-
ing between the parties and of such other circumstances as will develop
the actual marketing relationship between them, ' 2D e.g., evidence that the
distributor was an agent of the manufacturer.
The second means to achieve market division is the location clause.
Such a provision is clearly a more effective technique than assigned areas,
but is impractical for a manufacturer like Snap-On Tools Co. which had
dealers operating from mobile trucks. There are generally three ways for
a franchisor to control distribution through location clauses. Some agree-
ments specify that the franchisor has the right to approve the exact loca-
tion and building of each of the franchise operations. Other franchisors
may agree to secure an option on a particular site and make it available
to the franchisee. As a third alternative, the franchisor may own the facili-
ties and lease them to the franchisee. No antitrust problems should arise un-
less the franchisor uses the lease-renewal or location approval in a coercive
manner."' The Supreme Court in General Motors declined to question the
legality of the location clause in dealer contracts at the urging of the
Government,"' while the Second Circuit has upheld their legality."'
The location and area of primary responsibility clauses may be the maxi-
mum contractual restrictions which the antitrust laws allow for Schwinn-
type distribution arrangements. It is unclear whether greater restrictions
will be permitted for franchise systems which require greater controls for
trademark purposes."' The broad language of Schwinn would seem to
foreclose any absolute restraints on a franchisee's sales by customer or
territorial designation under any circumstances. If the Schwinn holding
is not limited in future cases, the only other restriction which a franchisor
could impose upon a franchisee would be an announcement of a policy
of market division and a unilateral refusal to deal with any party violating
the policy.




2 1 Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
. United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966).
.. aBoro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942). The Supreme
Court of Texas held that a location clause did not violate the state antitrust statutes in Ford Motor
Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W.2d 230 (1943).
4In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the allocation of
territory among manufacturers of a product was held to go far beyond protection of the trade-
name "Timken." According to the Court, on the basis of the "ancillary" theory of United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899), the agreement was violative of the Sherman
Act because it was not ancillary to a valid trademark licensing transaction. However, in Denison
Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 1962), the circuit court dis-
tinguished Timken and found that the agreement to divide sales territories went no further than




Lanham Act Requirements. Trademark ownership and licensing create a
relevant context for a discussion of the desirable quality controls on the
franchised manufacturer and retailer. Indeed, a primary and functional
objective of any franchise system coincides with an objective of the Lan-
ham Act:' uniformity and maintenance of standards of quality in both
services and goods throughout business enterprises operating with the same
mark. To satisfy the requirements of the Act, a franchisor may employ a
variety of methods to enforce prescribed standards. For example, the fran-
chise agreement may provide for the inspection, supervision, or testing by
the franchisor, and for training programs for the franchisee or his em-
ployees. An Operations Manual may supplement this control with more
specific instructions."' While none of these methods falls within the pur-
view of federal antitrust laws, quality controls achieved by restricting the
purchases or sales by the franchisee will come under antitrust scrutiny.
Because such restraints at the same time may satisfy the affirmative duties
of the Lanham Act and may afford some of the most effective quality
controls, they are perhaps the most difficult features of the franchise re-
lationship to construct."'
There are many variations of restrictions on sales and purchases. One of
the most common restrictions requires the franchisee to buy supplies from
a number of approved sources." 9 A more direct means of quality control
compels the franchisee to buy ingredients, parts, accessory items, or the
product itself from the franchisor." Frequently this direct means of
quality control involves purchases of a tied product from the franchisor...
or a sponsored product from another manufacturer at the insistance of the
franchisor."' s In order to insure adequate and prompt service, the fran-
chisor may want the franchisee to focus his primary sales on the trade-
mark product. This emphasis on high standards of service to protect the
good will of an established brand name or the competitive needs of a new
12515 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964). The Lanham Act protects trademark or servicemark
property rights by providing for federal registration of the marks. Section 1055 permits licensing
of a mark to "related companies . . . provided such mark is not used in such a manner as to deceive
the public." Control over the licensee is required by § 1127 which defines "related company"
as "any person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant . . . in respect to the
nature and quality of the goods and services in connection with which the mark is used."
... Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Kan. 1962).
127 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
128 See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 823, 852 (1965);
Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 626 (1966); Comment,
Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
... Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Kan. 1962). The Dairy Queen
franchise agreement provided that franchisees "would use cones, cups, containers, topping, flavoring,
coloring and like materials such as could meet the standards of quality and specifications deter-
mined by the [franchisor] and . . . the prices of any suppliers so designated should be in line
with the prices of others engaged in a similar business. ... Id. at 716.
"'Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1958).
.. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently grant-
ed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). The Carvel franchise obligated each franchised dealer to purchase directly
from Carvel or from a source approved by Carvel his supply not only of the basic Carvel ice
cream mix, prepared under a secret formula, but also certain other products used in either the
preparation or sale.of the Carvel ice cream products. 332 F.2d at 11.
's2 See note 169 infra.
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company may force the franchisor to demand that the franchisee refrain
from selling even those items which are not in competition with the trade-
mark products of the franchisor. If the franchisor carries several lines with
different trademarks or a variety of items under one trademark, the fran-
chisee may be restricted to a particular line or one product. " Courts are
faced with the problem of dissecting compounded controls when the fran-
chisor places restrictions on both sales and purchases.
Antitrust Restrictions. In many cases restrictions couched in terms of
purchase requirements may have the same effect as direct restraints on
sales and differ from such restraints only in terminology. But more often
the purpose and effect of restrictions on purchases present important dif-
ferences and incur stricter treatment under antitrust law. Controls which
have the purpose and effect of preventing the franchisee from handling
competing products are treated generally as exclusive dealing arrange-
ments,'M while tying arrangements involve restraints on purchases of the
franchisee.
Quality controls restricting sales and purchases of a franchisee come
within a number of federal antitrust and regulatory statutes. When the
" Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 925 (1953). In the franchise agreement Motorola, the franchisor, reserved an exclusive right
to sell certain communication equipment.
a An "exclusive dealing" arrangement places restrictions on the franchisee and the discussion
of quality controls in section III of this Comment is limited to the legality of controls which a
franchisor may impose on a franchisee. However, a common corollary to dealing restrictions on
the franchisee is a reciprocal restriction on the franchisor whereby the franchisor agrees not to
franchise or to sell products to another retailer in a given area. Thus, the franchisee is granted an
"exclusive dealership." Absent monopoly power, restraints on the commercial activity of the
franchisor which enables one franchisee to have an exclusive dealership in an area, have been uni-
formly upheld by the federal courts when the restraints were attacked by another franchisee whose
dealership has been terminated. In such cases the legality of an exclusive dealership is based on the
manufacturer's right, as recognized in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), to
exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal. Schwing Motor
Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956). See also Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v.
Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,
243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Brosious v. Pepsi Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946); E.A.
Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Ill. 1968). According to the Federal
Trade Commission: "The law is clear that exclusive dealership contracts are virtually per se legal,
absent monopolization or absent effective competition at the buyer and seller levels." Columbus
Coated Fabrics Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1500 (1959). However, the Fourth Circuit remanded a case to
determine whether an exception based on agency principles should be made to the general rule
that exclusive dealerships are terminable without antitrust consequences. It was reasoned that the
franchisee acted as an agent in establishing retail outlets and had apparently spent a considerable
sum of money in reliance upon the franchise. Therefore, the trial court was instructed to entertain
facts to decide if the franchisee was entitled to damages. Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Eng'r Prods.,
Inc., 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956).
In Texas when a terminated retailer or franchisee has sued the franchisor, the courts have de-
nied relief to the plaintiff, thus reaching the same result as suits in federal courts involving re-
fusals to deal. The Texas courts, however, have used exactly opposite reasoning. Exclusive dealer-
ships are held to violate Texas antitrust statutes. Climatic Air Distribs. v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc.,
162 Tex. 237, 345 S.W.2d 702 (1961); Albin v. Isotron Corp., 421 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967); Robison v. Roberts, 279 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), error ref.; Grand Prize
Distrib. Co. v. Gulf Brewing Co., 267 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. The ex-
clusive dealing contract is deemed to be void; therefore the manufacturer or franchisor has been
denied recovery of royalty payments, Patrizi v. McAninch, 153 Tex. 389, 269 S.W.2d 343 (1954),
and indebtedness, Morris v. J.1 Case Credit Corp., 411 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). An
exception to the general rule in Texas that exclusive dealership agreements are void exists where
an agency relationship is involved or where the agreement is collateral to a lease for premises
owned by the franchisor or seller who agrees not to sell to anyone other than the lessee. Schnitzer v.
Southwest Shoe Corp., 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963).
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general language of the Sherman Act proved inadequate to test exclusive
dealing arrangements," the Clayton Act"' was passed to fill the gap in
the antitrust laws. Its construction is the crucial key to the legality of
such arrangements in most cases. The Clayton Act expressly prohibits both
kinds of restrictions under certain circumstances, but the specific language
of section 3 of the Act limits its application:
It shall be unlawful for any person . .. to lease or make a sale or contract
for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodi-
ties, whether patented or unpatented . . . or fix a price charged therefor,
or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodity of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease,
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.13 7
Quality controls also may be subject to scrutiny under the anti-merger
section 7 of the Clayton Act, ' sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,"'
the Robinson-Patman Act,'" and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.'
Despite this impressive array of federal statutes, exclusive dealing arrange-
ments and, less frequently, tying arrangements withstand antitrust charges.
The broader rule of reason or a quasi per se test permitting the introduc-
tion of evidence justifying an exclusive dealing restriction, rather than a
strict per se test, is applied to test the legality of these restraints in cases
involving alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section
3 of the Clayton Act. A franchisor legally may require the licensee of a
trademark to obtain the franchisor's approval of suppliers of ingredients
or parts, unless the circumstances of a monopoly or unfair trade practices
exist. 4' Under the protective umbrella of trademark requirements, contract
provisions designating suppliers have been upheld by the courts of the
Fifth'"' and Second Circuits.'M In addition, because a substantial lessening
of competition is required under section 3 of the Clayton Act, the courts
have been unable to fashion a strict per se doctrine to be applied to tying
agreements.
"'E.g., Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903); and see cases cited
in M. HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION 542 (4th ed. 1967).
...38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 55 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22-27, 44 (1964), 29 U.S.C.
55 52, 53 (1964).
117l 5 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
38id. 5 18.
"926 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
14038 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964); see Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289
F. Supp. 884 (D.R.I. 1968) (price discrimination).
14138 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
141 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
"'"Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).
'
44 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 5o5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
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Exclusive Dealing. There are two types of exclusive dealing contracts
which the courts have examined: requirements contracts and agreements
that the buyer will not carry a competing line. Early cases determined
the illegality of such contracts or agreements by finding that the seller
occupied a dominant position in the relevant market. "' Thus, the illegal
effect of substantially lessening competition was shown by proof of con-
trol over two-fifths of the retailers in a market.' In the last two decades
the attitudes of the Supreme Court and the Federal Trade Commission
have fluctuated in their treatment of exclusive dealing provisions. In
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,'" a 1949 decision, the Supreme Court
indicated that, regardless of the fact that Standard did not have a dominant
position in the market, the requirements contract should be subject to a
quasi per se test. The Court, adopting a "quantitative substantiality" stand-
ard of proof, "9 held that the qualifying clause of section 3 was satisfied
by proof that the contract covered "a substantial share of the line of com-
merce affected.""... A gross business sales totaling 6.7 per cent of the total
sales in the relevant market was deemed to be a substantial share of the
market. Thus, it was unnecessary for the Government to demonstrate that
competitive activity had actually diminished or probably would diminish.
Moreover, Standard's evidence of an increase in the number of its com-
petitors was properly excluded. While lower courts"' varied in the applica-
tion of the Standard Oil decision, the Federal Trade Commission failed
to follow the Court's standard of proof and continued to examine all rele-
vant factors, including evidence of new competition in the market."'
In the 1960's the courts and the Federal Trade Commission reversed
their positions with regard to the standard of proof necessary to establish
a violation in exclusive dealing cases.' The Supreme Court in Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co."' stressed the need "to weigh the prob-
able effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition,"'' .
regardless of the fact that a substantial share of the market might be
affected. In Brown Shoe Co.,"19 however, the Federal Trade Commission
utilized its broader authority under section 5 of the FTC Act, and applied
a quasi per se test to declare illegal the restrictions on independent shoe
retailers who, nevertheless, were called franchisees of Brown Shoe. Viola-
145 See note 134 supra for the scope of the discussion of exclusive dealing arrangements and for
a brief account of the legality of exclusive dealership contracts.
'4 Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); cf. Pearsall
Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 292 F. 720 (7th Cir. 1923).
'
4 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
148337 U.S. 293 (1949).
149 Id. at 298.
15Id. at 314. The Court followed the reasoning of International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947), and stated that the test of substantiality for the applicability of the Clayton Act
to requirements and tying contracts should be the same.
"' E.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).
15Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
"'See ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, MARCH 31, 1955 (prepared
by ABA Antitrust Section 1968).
154365 U.S. 320 (1961).
lHid. at 329.
IS 6 2 F.T.C. 679 (1963).
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tion of the FTC Act was shown by the fact that the largest producer of
shoes in the United States required retailers not to sell lines which would
compete with its lines. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commissioner's
use of the market dominance test,"7 but the history of illegal monopoly
by Brown Shoe Co.1" and the lack of identity between the company and
its retailers distinguished the case from other cases involving exclusive
dealing contracts.
By a rationale similar to that used in Tampa Electric, exclusive dealing
contracts have been held to be legal where the particular arrangement
had a reasonable economic basis and the seller did not have a monopoly.15
For example, in a suit between an outboard motor distributor and the
manufacturer, evidence of "squalor and poor organization," failure to
give adequate dealer service to purchasers, and a poor accounting system
justified a termination of the dealership when the distributor began to sell
a competing line of engines."
Perhaps the most significant case for the majority of franchise distribu-
torships is Susser v. Carvel Corp."1 which upheld an exclusive dealing
arrangement on the basis of trademark protection. In order effectively to
analyze the restraints placed upon the chain of 400 franchise ice cream
stores, the court was required to dissect the price maintenance, exclusive
dealing, and tying features of the Carvel franchise system. The charge of
illegal exclusive dealing was based on a provision in the franchise contract
which required the dealer to sell only Carvel trademark products. The
court of appeals relied on the factor "which the Supreme Court had deem-
ed significant in Tampa Electric-that of economic justification '162 to up-
hold the limitation. Economic justification was found in Carvel in the
licensing of the trademark. The court explained:
The antitrust laws certainly do not require that the licensor of a trademark
permit his licensees to associate with that trademark other products un-
related to those customarily sold under the mark . . . . Trademark licensing
agreements requiring the sole use of the trademarked item have withstood
attack under the anti-trust laws where deemed reasonably necessary, to pro-
tect the goodwill interest of the trademark owner .... '"
One commentator has suggested that Susser v. Carvel Corp. should be
read in connection with FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.'" which he considers
"unrelated to franchising of the type we encounter most of the time-
entire retail business licensing."'' 0 Apparently the Federal Trade Com-
'
57 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966), re-v'g 339 F.2d 45 (8th
Cir. 1964).
15"See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
'"E.g., Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 994 (1953).
'
60Amplex of Md., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1967).
101 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125
(1965).
1l Id. at 516.
"s Id. at 517.
114384 U.S. 316 (1966).
165 Fels, Franchising; Legal Problems and the Business Framework of Reference-An Overview,
in BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE TRANscrP'r 4, 47 (J. McCord & I.
Cohen eds. 1968). He noted these distinguishing features: the secrecy of Carvel's formula, the
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mission agrees with the distinction that Carvel was dealing with its own
franchised outlets whereas Brown Shoe was dealing with retailer outlets
which were not Brown Shoe stores.'
The Colgate doctrine, permitting a mere refusal to deal where the fran-
chisee will not agree to sell exclusively the franchisor's product, has given
a degree of protection to a franchisor's "right of customer selection.. 1.7
This right has been invoked as a defense to antitrust charges by both fran-
chisor and manufacturers and has been recognized by the courts in suits
brought under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.'
To find a violation of either the Sherman or Clayton Act, a court must
find that there is an agreement to deal exclusively and that the arrange-
ment is unreasonable. The failure to plead the factual grounds for a con-
spiracy or agreement has prevented recovery in a number of treble damage
suits. 6 However, the Government has been successful in proving a viola-
tion of section 1 by introducing evidence of oral agreements imposed by
an oil company on its lessees to deal exclusively in its products or its
sponsored "TBA" products.' In a suit involving the same oil company,"
the Ninth Circuit held that both a manufacturer of a competing line of
car wax and its distributors had a cause of action for treble damages against
the oil company. As in price fixing cases, an illegal agreement may be shown




problem in policing the food product, and the complete involvement of the Carvel name in the
entire operation of each.
.6 Federal Trade Commissioner Mary Gardner Jones has stated that "the distribution arrange-
ments involved in the Brown Shoe, Schwinn and GM cases, in my judgment, were not what I
would call pure franchising arrangements." Jones, Franchising From the Standpoint of the Federal
Trade Commission, in BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF TiiE FRANCHISE TRANSCRIPT 249, 263
(J. McCord & I. Cohen eds. 1968). Commissioner Jones then mentioned the Carvel case specifical-
ly: "The distinction between a distribution system such as I believe was involved in Schwinn,
for example, and a true franchise arrangement such as was involved in the Carvel case is an im-
portant one." Id. at 264. Another indication of the Commission attitude toward entire business
licensing is the voluntary dismissal of the Carvel suit. See also Wilson, An Emerging Enforcement
Policy for Franchising, 15 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1969).
117 McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 1959). See also
Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (sth Cir. 1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
'..Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1962); Leo
J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875
(1954). In each case no violation of the Clayton Act was found. For suits brought under the
Sherman Act or both Acts see supra notes 159, 160, and infra note 169.
... Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 925 (1953). The court stated that: "It is the well recognized rule that in pleading a con-
spiracy in an action such as this, a general allegation of conspiracy, without a statement of the
facts constituting the conspiracy to restrain trade, its object and accomplishment, is but an allega-
tion of a legal conclusion, which is insufficient to constitute a cause of action." Id. at 913-14. The
factual defect consisted of the fact that a corporation cannot conspire with itself and its agents,
who were employees of the franchisor-corporation. The Nelson holding was criticized in Walker
Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963), as going too far in requir-
ing details in an antitrust complaint. Apparently a general allegation of conspiracy was sufficient
to indicate a combination between the manufacturer and other distributors or one among the
distributors.
" United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam,
343 U.S. 922 (1952). "TBA" is the expression used frequently by the courts to denote tires, bat-
teries, and accessories. See also note 175 infra.
"' Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
.
7
.McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
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Tying Arrangements. A tying arrangement constitutes a specific type
of exclusive dealing contract in which two distinct products are involved.
The buyer is forced to take an undesired second item in order to pur-
chase the one he does want. Because of distinctions between exclusive
dealing agreements and tying arrangements, courts have required greater
justification before tying arrangements escape antitrust charges.' The
gravamen of the tying arrangement is the use by the seller of his eco-
nomic power in one market to lessen competition in another. Therefore,
the amount of market foreclosure necessary to prove a violation of sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act is significantly less for a tying arrangement than
for an exclusive dealing contract." A quasi per se rule is applied to tying
arrangements under section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the
Sherman Act."
The Court's formulation of per se principles to test the legality of tying
arrangements at times has been unclear because of the persistent problem
of determining what degree of control over the market of the tying
product is sufficient to support the inference that competition has been,
or probably will be, lessened. In early cases under section 3 the inference
that the seller dominated the market to the exclusion of any other was
supported if the tying product were patented.' However, in International
Salt Co. v. United States'" the use of a patented machine to tie purchases
of salt was not a controlling issue. It was not shown that equivalent ma-
chines were unavailable or that the defendant controlled the market of
the patented machines. In determining that a summary judgment was
proper, the Supreme Court held that proof of adverse economic conse-
quences and the unreasonableness of the restraint was unnecessary since
.73 See Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L.
REV. 88 (1967); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
HARv. L. REV. 50 (1958). See also Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287
F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968).
'7 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); see
note 150 supra.
"'A quasi per se rule has also been applied under S 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
to arrangements which are similar to tying arrangements but involve two sellers acting in con-
junction. The Federal Trade Commission in three related proceedings successfully attacked agree-
ments between three major oil companies and major tire manufacturers for the promotion of TBA
sales and for sales commissions to be paid to the oil company which promoted the TBA among its
retailers. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 360 F.2d 470
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). In the Texaco case, Texaco did not contest
the conclusions of the District of Columbia Circuit court (Texaco v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 383
F.2d 942, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1967)) and the Fifth Circuit in Shell that dominant economic power
over gasoline dealers is "inherent in the structure and economics of the petroleum distribution
system" (360 F.2d at 481). The Supreme Court in Texaco found that such a sales commission
system is "inherently coercive" and has an adverse effect on competition in a not insignificant
volume of commerce, based on an annual volume of purchases by retail dealers of $245,000,000.
393 U.S. at 230, 231. See also Osbur v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), where
the circuit court treated the arrangement between Sinclair and Goodyear as a per se illegal tie-in
arrangement.
Another type of arrangement related to tie-in agreements has come under recent attack by the
Justice Department. Two cases were filed against reciprocal dealings as the sole alleged offense in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1969, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.). U.S.
Steel Corp., charged with violation of the Act, entered into a consent decree.
176 See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
'"7332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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the "volume of business affected" by the tying contracts was significant
or substantial."8
The Supreme Court has since backed away from its holding in Inter-
national Salt. In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States... two
standards of proof for establishing the illegality of tying arrangements
were discussed:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying'
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is
restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed
in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite potential
lessening of competition is inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist
it is 'unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors, from any substantial
market,' a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act when-
ever both conditions are met. In either case, the arrangement transgresses
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."'
Control of forty per cent of the newspaper advertising market was in-
sufficient to support a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Alternatively,
the Court found that no tying problem existed because it considered that
only one product was sold.' 8'
Since 1953 the Supreme Court has revised the content of the dual test
in Times-Picayune but not the form. In 1958 the requirement of a mo-
nopolistic position was redefined to mean "sufficient economic power to
impose an appreciable restraint" in order to prove a per se violation of the
Sherman Act."' The Court used the International Salt decision as the basis
for upholding a summary judgment declaring the tying arrangement
illegal."  The tying product was "strategically located"' "  land within
economic distance of transportation facilities owned by the lessor and was
essential to the business activities of some lessees. In a subsequent case the
Court again rejected market dominance as the only test of whether a
seller has the requisite economic power illegally to tie a product." Absent
market dominance, "the crucial economic power may be inferred from
the tying products desirability to consumers or from uniqueness of its
attributes."'"1 In that case a copyright created a presumption of the requi-
site uniqueness.
A further definition of the degree of market power necessary to sup-
port a per se violation occurred in 1969 in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp.," a decision which sharply divided the Court.
Although the tying arrangement was said to be the "traditional kind,"'' .
the significance of the particular tying product-credit-had not been
"'SId. at 396.
179345 U.S. 594 (1953).
1"Id. at 608-09.
"Iid. at 614.
" Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
"3 142 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Wash. 1956).
8'356 U.S. at 7.
"United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
18Id. at 45.




previously considered by the Supreme Court. In reversing a summary
judgment for defendant corporation and remanding, the Supreme Court
noted that proof of the uniquely advantageous terms of the credit raised
questions of fact which could bring the arrangement under the per se rule.
There were apparently three factors alleged by the plaintiff which com-
pelled the Court to reverse the lower court's finding of insufficient eco-
nomic power: (1) the substantial price differential of the tied product
(prefabricated homes) over the current market price which in a truly com-
petitive market the buyers would not have accepted, (2) "uniquely and
unusually advantageous terms" '' offered with the tying credit, and (3)
evidence of the creditor's unique economic ability to provide 100 per cent
financing at low rates. The two dissents in Fortner'" not only questioned
whether a tying arrangement was actually involved but also whether,
assuming a tying arrangement, there was sufficient showing of any market
power. Justice White felt that "low price in the tying product-money,
the most fungible item of trade since it is by definition an economic
counter-is especially poor proof of market power....
The reach of the Fortner decision may be narrower than the "vast and
destructive" effect speculated by the dissent of former Justice Fortas. As
he pointed out, "[i]t is common in our economy for a seller to extend
financing to a distributor or a franchisee to enable him to purchase and
handle the seller's goods at retail, to rent facilities, to acquire fixtures or
machinery for service to customers . . . .""' However, since the majority
distinguished credit sales, which would involve only a single product, the
Fortner decision may not apply to most credit transactions. Moreover, it
may have no significance for "pure" franchise arrangements.
As the Supreme Court noted, on remand the defendants could either
prove that they did not have a competitive advantage or could justify
the tying arrangement by showing legitimate business purposes. Some
cases have supplied examples of such legitimate reasons for tying arrange-
ments. The First Circuit held that proof of a majority of dissatisfied cus-
tomers was sufficient to justify a tying contract for the purpose of pre-
venting complaints.9 The Supreme Court found economic justification
in a company's attempt to establish a new product line, but the lawful-
ness of the tying contract at its inception did not continue once the line
was established.'"
In credit transactions between a franchisor and the licensee of his trade-
mark quality controls could justify a tying arrangement. Indeed, in Susser
v. Carvel Corp."  there was involvement of the trademark in the entire
business operation of the franchisee. The Second Circuit held that arrange-
"'Id. at 505.
'"°Id. at 510 (White, J., joined by Harlan, J.); id. at 520 (Fortas, J., joined by Stewart, J.).
91Id. at 515.
1121d. at 524.
"9sDehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961).
,94United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
95 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125(1965).
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ments tying supplies may be immunized if the tying contract is useful in
fulfilling the obligations of the Lanham Act and protecting the good will
of the trademark licensor, or if the specifications for products to be
substituted "would be so complex and detailed as to make it impracticable
• . . to establish such specifications."'" Judge Friendly not only found
justification for the Carvel arrangement, but he agreed that Carvel's trade-
mark lacked the prominence to give it sufficient economic power to create
an illegal tying contract in the first place.
One aspect of the Carvel decision should be a source of caution to the
franchisor, especially if machines or services are involved or if no trade
secrets give the franchisor added economic justification."' Although Chief
Judge Lumbard's discussion of the tying arrangement did not prevent
affirmance of their validity, his attitude invites caution. He believed that
the requisite economic leverage for an unlawful agreement could be pre-
sumed from the license of the Carvel trademark itself, buttressed by the
array of patents and subsidiary trademarks, '1 which composed the tying
product. Thus, the significance of the trademark was equated with the
power generated by a patent or copyright. However, neither the Second
nor the Fifth Circuit has accepted the disastrous implications of Chief
Judge Lumbard's analogy for a small sized franchise distribution system
of the Carvel type.'99 Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission refused to
find that a tying arrangement was involved in Carvel's system. According
to Commissioner Jones, "the sale to the licensee of the mix and other
products cannot really be separated from the license. Both were necessary
in combination to permit the dealer to exercise fully the license."'
IV. CONCLUSION
An overview of decisions affecting the legality of restraints in the three
categories of franchise practices indicates that the courts are expanding
the application of the strict per se test of unreasonableness under federal
antitrust statutes and are continuing to develop a quasi per se test for
tying arrangements. The expansion of a strict per se doctrine has limited
the controls which a franchisor may maintain over a franchisee. Because
of the Parke, Davis decision, proof of an implicit agreement from a course
of conduct will satisfy the statutory demand for a combination under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act in any case challenging a restriction on price,
territory, purchases, or sales of a franchisee. Territorial and customer re-
straints vertically imposed are expressly foreclosed except in an agency
relationship.
The Supreme Court, in holding territorial or customer restraints on
19 332 F.2d at 515.
" The law has a "high regard" for the protection of trade secrets. Handler, Recent Antitrust
Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 858 (1965); see cases cited therein.
118 332 F.2d at 513. See also United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), motion to dismiss granted, 172 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
'Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).2
00Susser v. Carvel, 1965 Trade Cas. 5 71,435, at 80,887 (F.T.C. 1965).
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goods sold illegal, applied the per se rule directly to features of franchise
systems which are long established, considerably large and successful. It
remains for future cases to determine whether the blanket language of
the Schwinn case will be modified in cases involving new or failing com-
panies. The emphasis on the horizontal-vertical distinction in Sealy, which
was decided at the same time as Schwinn, provides the foundation for a
narrowing of the Schwinn opinion. If the Sealy emphasis cannot serve
that function, then the Court was misleading in its review of the per se
illegality of horizontal restraints and recognition that vertical restrictions
have a different character. If modification is made after the Court has had
more opportunities to investigate the economic impact of various types
of franchise systems, an exception to the Schwinn holding could be made
on the basis of trademark protection required by the Lanham Act. How-
ever, it would be necessary for Congress to make a statutory exception
to the antitrust laws for territorial and customer restrictions in a franchise
context if the per se test is not to be applied to the majority of such re-
straints."' Regardless of what change the future may hold, for the present
the position of the law with regard to vertical restraints for purposes of
market division is similar to the approach of the early decisions condemning
resale price fixing. It leaves a franchisor the hazardous alternative of an-
nouncing a policy which is potentially a per se violation and then refusing
to deal with an uncooperative franchisee in the hope of proving unilateral
action and establishing a Colgate-type precedent.
Admittedly, a per se rule has certain benefits, if the scope of its appli-
cation is clear."' The difficult task of government enforcement of the anti-
trust laws is facilitated. In addition, implementing a per se doctrine will
simplify private actions for treble damages to determine the legality of ter-
ritorial restraints or tying arrangements in suits which otherwise would be
too costly or too complex. The Schwinn decision may cause renewed efforts
to stimulate intrabrand competition which is not detrimental to interbrand
competition. For example, in granting a primary area of responsibility a
franchisor will be prompted to offer protection to each franchisee by
requiring the forwarding of inquiries from customers outside the fran-
chisee's territory and at the same time promote competition among the
licensees by permitting each to sell to the potential buyer."' 3
Exceptions to the strict per se rule have not been made because a fran-
201 Legislation has been proposed in Congress to permit territorial and customer restrictions
vertically imposed by a franchisor. S. 2549, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 974, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
02 See Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its After-
mnath, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1968).
203 An agreement of apparently recent date granting the franchisee a primary area of re-
sponsibility had the following clause, the legality of which is doubtful:
When Licensee receives inquiry(ies) from any firm or organization having auton-
omous branches outside Licensee's territory, Licensee shall (attempt to sell [to] only
those branches of said firm or organization located within Licensee's territory; and,
simultaneously, shall) advise [the franchisor] Company of said inquiry(ies), and
the addresses of those branches located outside Licensee's territory. Company then
will alert all other Licensees in whose respective territories said branches are located.




chise relationship exists between the parties to an illegal agreement. How-
ever, where a quasi per se rule is used or where the broader reasonableness
test is applied, a franchise relationship which commonly is buttressed by
trademark rights has provided economic justification to prove that a
restraint is reasonable and thus legal. The courts have been most sensitive
and willing to apply the rule of reason to the needs of a franchisor to
protect his trademark and goodwill, and it is in the area of quality con-
trols that the rule of reason should play the significant role.
